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2nd draft 
Burger Introduction 
On November 26, 1973, Chief Justice Warren Burger spoke to the 
Fordham community about the need for improved legal advocacy skills 
in the American legal system. Rarely has a lecture in an academic 
setting had the effect of Chief Justice Burger's Sonnett lecture. 
The lecture has been cited hundreds of times, and sparked a torrent 
of discussion on the quality of attorneys and what can be done for 
improvement. The Chief Justice's lecture was the impetus for the 
popularization of clinical legal education and especially, trial 
advocacy programs in legal education. 
The legal profession is steeped in precedent. Since past 
decisions shape the law of the future, change occurs slowly. 
Sometimes, the legal world needs to be pushed into the future. 
Chief Justice Burger's Sonnett lecture provided such a push. By 
criticizing the quality of attorneys, the Chief Justice provided 
the strongest possible voice for change. As a result, law schools 
began to refocus on practical ways to teach advocacy skills. While 
problems certainly remain in the area of legal advocacy, Chief 
Justice Burger's lecture began a stream of improvements which still 
flows today. 
In his lecture, the Chief. Justice explored the state of 
advocacy and suggested solutions to the problems he described. 
Chief Justice Burger's discussion of the "pupillage" system 
presents interesting ideas on development of apprenticeships in our 
own system. His proposals for certification of advocates provided 
new options for the improvement of the legal profession. The most 
important result of Chief Justice Burger's lecture, however, was 
the discussion it fostered and the varied experiments that these 
discussions produced. 
The problem of improving advocacy skills still remains with 
the legal profession. John Sennett himself was noted for his 
skills as an advocate. For this reason, the Sennett Memorial 
Lecturers of ten discuss legal advocacy and will continue to make 
contributions to the important issues in this area. At Fordham, 
we hope Chief Justice Burger's lecture will remain an impetus for 
improvement of attorney advocacy skills. As the skills of 
attorneys improve, the services rendered to clients and society 
improve as well. The profession does itself a service when it 
ponders the ideas expressed by the Chief Justice. 
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THE SPECIAL SKILLS OF ADVOCACY: 
Are Specialized Training and Certification of Advocates 
Essential to Our System of Justice? 
WARREN E. BURGER* 
This occasion is one on which friends of John F. Sennett 
undertake to pay tribute to him as a person, as an outstanding 
advocate and as a distinguished public servant. It seems an 
appropriate occasion, therefore, to raise for the consideration of 
our profession a problem of large scope and profound importance to 
all judges, to all lawyers, to the public and, of course, to law 
schools. I believe that John Sennett, as a skillful advocate and 
one deeply committed to our system of justice in all its 
manifestations, would have shared some of the anxieties I express 
concerning the quality of advocacy in our courts. 
To say we have a "crisis" in the availability of adequate 
legal services may go too far, but sober, careful and responsible 
observers of the legal profession have posed the need in almost 
precisely those terms. 1 My objective in this discussion is not to 
canvass the swiftly growing need for all kinds of legal services, 
but to discuss narrowly the need for skilled courtroom advocacy 
with a special emphasis on the administration of criminal justice. 
I submit that we can deal with this critical situation if we direct 
our attention to the causes and think imaginatively about a remedy. 
We will not lack patterns or precedents. 
What I will propose later in this discussion is that some 
system of certification for trial advocates is an imperative and 
a long overdue step. Beyond any particular system, however, is the 
fundamental fact that how lawyers are trained--during and after 
law school will determine their skills as advocates and ultimately 
the quality of our justice. That fundamental fact is nowhere 
better revealed than in the English experience. 
Although our system is a child of the common law, the legal 
profession has developed in ways that do not parallel England's. 
Our wide expanses of territory, our heterogeneous and turbulent 
1 H. Packer & T. Ehrlich, New Directions in Legal Education 
6 (1972). 
diversity, and our more than fifty jurisdictions with 150 
accredited law schools would make it impossible to transplant the 
English system here, and I do not suggest it by any means. But 
simply because we cannot adopt the English system does not mean 
that we cannot learn much from its operation. 
Several aspects of the English legal profession stand out 
clearly when we look for causes of effective advocacy: 
·1. England separates its trial lawyers--the barristers--into 
a separate branch of the profession and they engage exclusively in 
trial work. ~ 
2. Of the 30,000 lawyers in England, 3,000 are barristers. 
3. England has about sixty-five lawyers per 100,000 
population; the United States has about 160 lawyers per 100,000 
population. 
4. All English barristers are trained in a centuries-old 
school conducted by the four Inns of Court. After training in this 
school of advocacy, a barrister must spend a period of "pupilage," 
or apprenticeship, with an established barrister. 
5. The four Inns of Court occupy quarters in or near the Royal 
Courts of Justice, and barristers' offices are situated in the same 
area, thus creating a unique professional community. 
I will not try to compare a barrister's productivity with that 
of an American trial lawyer. That would be unfair in part because 
the methods and procedures in English courts are generally 
conducive to speedier justice than we manage to deliver. 
Every qualified observer of the English system with whom I 
have discussed this subject makes the same observation that I have 
made, drawing on twenty years of rather close contact with the 
British system, namely, that their trials are conducted in a 
fraction of the time we expend in the United States for comparable 
litigation. This is a generalization that has a solid basis and 
can be readily documented. At once I must note another difference 
in that, except for libel, fraud and a few other kinds of cases 
that arise infrequently, civil cases in England are tried without 
a Jury, and judgment is almost invariably rendered forthwith at the 
close of trial. Appeals are the exception and are only by leave. 
Another difference is that judges of trial courts of general 
jurisdiction are selected entirely from the ranks of the ablest 
barristers. Thus, there is little or no on-the-job learning for 
trial judges as is all too often the case in the United States 
courts, both state and federal. Only the highest qualifications 
as a trial advocate enter into the selection of English judges. 
As a result, an English trial is in the hands of three 
highly-experienced litigation specialists who have a common 
professional background. Each advocate has also served an 
intensive "apprenticeship" before he or she is permitted to appear 
in court as lead counsel. 3 
3 It is widely accepted by England's bench and bar that these 
factors provide more expeditious determinations without impairing 
fair and just results. Whether a non-jury system for civil cases 
would be feasible in a geographically large and diverse country 
with a heterogeneous society like ours is open to serious question. 
There is no significant pressure to adopt the English non-jury 
system and I do not advocate it. 
The English training in advocacy places great stress on 
ethics, manners and deportment, both in the courtroom and in 
relations with other barristers and solicitors. The effectiveness 
of this training is reflected in their very high standards of 
ethics and conduct. Discipline is strict, but disciplinary actions 
for misconduct average about three a year for all of the 3,000 
barristers in England. My own personal observation, based on forty 
years of professional exposure, is that in any multiple-judge 
American courthouse, there are numerous daily offenses that would 
bring severe censure if committed by an English barrister. How 
many serious errors of counsel are made in trials, I would not 
venture to say J : 
I have heard it said occasionally by critics of the English 
legal system that it tends to be "clubby" and 
"establishment-oriented." 5 For twenty years, I have watched 
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advocates conduct trials in more than a dozen countries, and 
nowhere have I seen more ardent, more effective advocacy than in 
the courts of England. English advocacy is generally on a par with 
that of our best lawyers. I emphasize that their best advocates 
are no better than our best, but I regret to say that our best 
constitute a relatively thin layer of cream on top while the 
quality of the English barristers is uniformly high, albeit with 
gradations of quality inescapable in any human activity. 
What, then, can we learn from the English legal profession? 
We should first recognize three implicit and basic assumptions 
about legal training that permeate their system. First: lawyers, 
like people in other professions, cannot be equally competent for 
all tasks in our increasingly complex society and increasingly 
complex legal system in particular; second: legal educators can and 
should develop some system whereby students or new graduates who 
have selected, even tentatively, specialization in trial work can 
~ • ., ••• .-
learn its essence under the tutelage of experts, not by trial and 
error at clients' expense; and third: ethics, manners and civility 
in the courtroom are essential ingredients and the lubricants of 
the inherently contentious adversary system of justice; they must 
be understood and developed by law students beginning in law 
school. 
These three basic assumptions are sound and sensible, whether 
applied to the English system or to our own. Simply because we 
cannot implement the assumptions in the same manner as the English 
have done does not mean we cannot recognize their validity. Even 
though we cannot have, and most emphatically do not want, a small 
elite, Barrister-like class of lawyers does not mean we cannot take 
positive steps to promote qualified courtroom advocacy skills in 
those attorneys who choose to specialize in trial advocacy. 
Indeed, our failure to do so has helped bring about the low state 
of American trial advocacy and a consequent diminution in the 
quality of our entire system of justice. The high purposes of the 
Criminal Justice Act6 will be frustrated unless qualified advocates 
are appointed to represent indigents. 
For centuries most societies have used performance standards 
for entry into certain human activities that affect large numbers 
of people. 7 Standards, varying in effectiveness, have long been 
used in an attempt to assure qualified teachers, doctors, lawyers, 
electricians, and a host of others essential to a modern society. 
Yet, in spite of all the bar examinations and better law schools, 
we are more casual about qualifying the people we allow to act as 
advocates in the courtrooms than we are about licensing our 
electricians. We have no testing or licensing process designed to 
assure that those engaged to protect and vindicate important rights 
by trial advocacy are genuinely qualified for their crucial role 
6 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1970). 
in society. This is a curious aspect of a system that prides 
itself on the high place it accords to the judicial process in 
vindicating peoples' rights. 
II 
Our failure to inquire into advocates' qualifications--as is done, 
for example, in separating surgeons from doctors generally--
reveals itself in the mounting concern of those who see the 
consequences of inadequate courtroom performance and look for its 
causes. 
First, and perhaps overriding other causes, is our historic 
insistence that we treat every person admitted to the bar as 
qualified to give effective assistance on every kind of legal 
problem that arises in life, including the trial of criminal cases 
in which liberty is at stake, civil rights cases in which human 
values are at stake, and myriad ordinary cases dealing with 
important private personal interests. It requires only a moment's 
reflection to see that this assumption is no more justified than 
one that postulates that every holder of an M.D. degree is 
competent to perform surgery on the infinite range of ailments that 
afflict the human animal. 
There is no parallel in any other area of life's problems 
having serious consequence to our naive assumption that ever 
graduate of a law school is, by virtue of that fact, qualified for 
the ultimate confrontation in a courtroom. 8 No other profession is 
as casual or heedless of reality as ours. We know, however, that 
the successful law firms do not expose their clients to on-the-job 
training: they operate their own private "apprentice" or "intern" 
systems in which the young lawyer who is to engage in litigation 
is trained by assisting a partner in preparing cases for trial and 
then by assisting in the second or third chair. If these law firms 
were to allow the very bright but inexperienced, young lawyers to 
roam at large in the courts without close supervision, they would 
soon lose clients in droves. But we need shed no tears for the 
large law firms: necessity has long since forced them to develop 
their own in-house training comparable to that used in England for 
Barristers. 
So, we see that clients who can afford such lawyers--in the 
big firms or in the many excellent medium-size firms or indeed 
among this country's skilled sole practitioners--are well served 
by lawyers. But this is because those lawyers are not assigned 
tasks beyond their reach--something that happens regularly on both 
sides of the table in criminal cases today. 
We must acknowledge, I submit, that good advocates are made 
much as good airplane pilots are made--by study, by observation of 
experts and by training with experts. To pursue that analogy, an 
aspiring pilot who can fly a Piper Cub has learned something about 
flying but he is surely not ready to fly large commercial planes 
or a modern jet airliner. The painful fact is that the courtrooms 
of America all too often have "Piper Cub" advocates trying to 
handle the controls of "Boeing 747" litigation. (I should add that 
by no means are all the "Piper Cub" advocates recent law 
graduates.) 
A second cause of inadequate advocacy derives from certain 
aspects of law school education. Law schools fail to inculcate 
sufficiently the necessity of high standards of professional 
ethics, manners and etiquette as things basic to the lawyer's 
function. With few exceptions, law schools also fail to provide 
adequate and systematic programs by which students may focus on the 
elementary skills of advocacy. I have now joined those who propose 
that the basic legal education could well be accomplished in two 
years, after which more concrete and specialized legal education 
should begin. If the specialty is litigation, the training should 
be prescribed and supervised by professional advocates cooperating 
with professional teachers, for both are needed. A two-year 
program is feasible once we shake off the heritage of our 
agricultural frontier that the "young folls" should have three 
months vacation to help harvest the crops--a factor that continues 
to dominate our education. The third year in school should, for 
those who aspire to be advocates, concentrate on what goes on in 
courtrooms. This should be done under the guidance of 
practitioners along with professional teachers. The medical 
profession does not try to teach surgery simply with books; more 
than 80 percent of all medical teaching is done by practicing 
physicians and surgeons. Similarly, trial advocacy must be learned 
from trial advocates. 
After the third year, those who wish to be advocates should 
begin a pupilage period, assisting and participating in trials 
directly with experienced trial lawyers. 
Today we spend on the education of a lawyer only a fraction 
of what is devoted to educating a doctor. If we want an adequate 
system of justice, we must be prepared to spend more for it--and 
we cannot train truly effective advocates without spending more. 
We know that in the past few years much of what I am 
suggesting has had small beginnings in some law schools. So-called 
clinical programs have been developing rapidly, as reflected by the 
recent survey by the Council on Legal Education for Professional 
Responsibility. Many of these programs focus on trial advocacy. 
Recent rules, adopted by a number of state courts and some federal 
courts, allow students to appear in court as aides to lawyers. 9 
Another development is the growing number of law schools that 
are finally offering courses in trial advocacy. These are most 
effective when they provide training which students then use in 
so-called "clinical" programs. The National Institute for Trial 
Advocacy has, for the past two summers offered an intensive 
training program in trial advocacy designed to channel effective 
laboratory techniques into law schools as well as into professional 
circles.;~ The law school, however, is where the groundwork must 
be laid. 
9 For clinical programs, see Council on Legal Education for 
Professional Responsibility, Inc. (CLEPR) 7 Survey of Clinical 
Legal Education 1972-1973, May 15, 1973. For recent rules 
permitting student practice in court, see CLEPR, State Rules 
Permitting The Student Practice of Law: Comparisons and Comments 
(Including Selected Federal Rules) (2d ed. 1973). 
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We do not disparage the law as a profession when we insist 
that, like a carpenter or an electrician, the advocate must know 
how to use the tools of his "trade." Regrettably the development 
of these small beginnings in teaching elements of advocacy in law 
schools is off set somewhat when we see the subject of evidence 
become an elective rather than a required course. We might, with 
as much justification, try to make a lawyer without teaching 
contracts and wills as to omit the law of evidence. 
The third cause is the inevitable inability of prosecutor and 
public def ender off ices to provide the same kind of apprenticeships 
for their new lawyers as, for example, the large law firms provide. 
The prosecution offices and public defender facilities have neither 
the wealthy clients nor consequent financial resources of the large 
law firms to enable them to develop whatever skills they need to 
carry out their mission. Prosecutors and public defenders often 
learn advocacy skills by being thrown into trial. Valuable as this 
may be as a learning experience, there is a real risk that it may 
be at the expense of the hapless clients they represent--public or 
private. The trial of an important case is no place for on-the-job 
training of amateurs except under the guidance of a skilled 
advocate. 
III 
Time does not allow a recital of the myriad points of 
substantive law and procedure that an advocate in criminal cases 
should know in order to perform his or her task. Suffice it to say 
that in the past dozen or more years a whole range of new 
developments has drastically altered the trial of a criminal case. 
To give adequate representation, an advocate must be intimately 
familiar with these recent developments, most of them deriving from 
case law. 
Whether we measure the recent changes in terms of one decade 
or three, we see that the litigation volume, particularly in 
criminal cases, has escalated swiftly. The Criminal Justice Act 11 
and the Bail Reform Act, 12 the extension of new federal standards 
11 
12 
18 U.S.C. §3006A (1970). 
Id. §3146-52. 
to state courts, rising population, increased crime rates, creation 
of new causes of action and expanded civil remedies have 
contributed to the literal flood of cases in state and federal 
courts. 
Whatever the legal issues or claims, the indispensable element 
in the trial of a case is a minimally adequate advocate for each 
litigant. 13 Many judges in general jurisdiction trial courts have 
stated to me that fewer than 25 percent of the lawyers appearing 
before them are genuinely qualified; other judges go as high as 75 
percent. 14 I draw this from conversations extending over the past 
twelve to fifteen years at judicial meetings and seminars, with 
literally hundreds of judges and experienced lawyers. 15 It would 
be safer to pick a middle ground and accept as a working hypothesis 
that from one-third to one-half of the lawyers who appear in the 
13 Burger, Foreword to L. Patterson & E. Cheatham, The 
Profession of Law at v (1971). 
serious cases are not really qualified to render fully adequate 
representation. The trial of a 11 serious 11 case, whether for damages 
or for infringement of civil rights, or for a criminal felony, 
calls for the kind of special skills and experience that insurance 
companies, for example, seek out to defend damage claims. 16 
Let me try to put some flesh on the bones of these 
generalizations concerning the function and quality of the 
advocates. I will try to do this by way of a few examples observed 
when I sat by assignment as a trial judge, while serving on the 
U.S. Court of Appeals: 
1. The thousands of trial transcripts I have reviewed show 
that a majority of the lawyers have never learned the seemingly 
simple but actually difficult art of asking questions so as to 
develop concrete images for the fact triers and to do so in 
conformity with rules of evidence. 
2. Few lawyers have really learned the art of 
cross-examination, including the high art of when not to 
cross-examine. 
3. The rules of evidence generally forbid leading questions, 
but when there are simple undisputed facts, the leading-questions 
rule need not apply. Inexperienced lawyers waste time making 
wooden objections to simple, acceptable questions, on uncontested 
factual matters. 
4. Inexperienced lawyers are of ten unaware that 
"inflammatory" exhibits such as weapons or bloody clothes should 
not be exposed to jurors' sight until they are offered in evidence. 
5. An inexperienced prosecutor wasted an hour on the 
historical development of the fingerprint identification process 
discovered by the Frenchman Bertillon, until it finally developed 
that there was no contested fingerprint issue. Such examples could 
be multiplied almost without limit. 
Another aspect of inadequate advocacy--and one quite as 
important as familiarity with the rules of practice--is the failure 
of lawyers to observe the rules of professional manners and 
professional etiquette that are essential for effective trial 
advocacy. 
Jurors who have been interviewed after jury service, and some 
who have written articles based on their service, express dismay 
at the distracting effect of personal clashes between the lawyers. 
There is no place in a properly run courtroom for the shouting 
matches and other absurd antics of lawyers sometimes seen on 
television shows and in the movies. From many centuries of 
experience, the ablest lawyers and judges have found that certain 
quite fixed rules of etiquette and manners are the lubricant to 
keep the focus of the courtroom contest on issues and facts and 
away from distracting personal clashes and irrelevancies. 17 
A truly qualified advocate--like every genuine professional--
resembles a seamless garment in the sense that legal knowledge, 
forensic skills, professional ethics, courtroom etiquette and 
manners are blended in the total person as their use is blended in 
the performance of the function. 
There are some few lawyers who scoff at the idea that manners 
and etiquette form any part of the necessary equipment of the 
courtroom advocate. Yet, if one were to undertake a list of the 
truly great advocates of the past one hundred years, I suggest he 
would find a common denominator: they were all intensely 
individualistic, but each was a lawyer for whom courtroom manners 
were a key weapon in his arsenal. Whether engaged in the 
destruction of adverse witnesses or undermining damaging evidence 
or final argument, the performance was characterized by coolness, 
poise and graphic clarity, without shouting or ranting, and without 
baiting witnesses, opponents or the judge. We cannot all be great 
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advocates, but as every lawyer seeks to emulate such tactics, he 
can approach, if not achieve, superior skill as an advocate. 
What is essential is that certain standards of total advocacy 
performance be established and that we develop means to measure 
those standards, to the end that important cases have advocates who 
can give adequate representation. Law school students are adults 
who can contribute once they are persuaded of the need for training 
in this area. Rather than being "lectured" on ethics, they should 
be invited to discuss with the faculty and the best advocates the 
ethical element in the practice of law so as to impress them with 
the reality that courtroom ethics and etiquette are crucial to the 
lawyer's role in society--and indispensable to a rational system 
of justice. Woven into the seamless fabric of effective advocacy, 
professional ethics and professional manners are no less important 
than technical skills. 
Lawyers are--or should be--society' s peacemakers, problem 
solvers and stabilizers. The English historian Plucknett suggests 
that England and America have been largely spared cataclysmic 
revolutions for two centuries, in part because the common law 
system lends itself to gradual evolutionary change to meet the 
changing needs of people. Lawyers can fulfill that high mission 
only if they are properly trained. 
IV 
The focus on the inadequacies of advocates has tended to 
center on the criminal process, and it is plainly correct that this 
be given close attention and high priority. The first conviction 
of an accused person may be a determinant that shapes his entire 
future. Some convicted criminals do not need confinement in 
prison; neither they nor society can genuinely benefit from it. 
Effective advocacy can sometimes lead to other alternatives for a 
first of fender--such as a suspended sentence or deferred 
t . 18 prosecu ion. 
The contemporary literature tends to focus on the plight of 
18 As the ABA Committee on the Standards for Criminal Justice 
emphasized, the most important role and the most unsatisfactory 
performance of advocates may be at sentencing. See ABA Project on 
Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to 
Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures (Approved Draft 1968). 
the defendant and the inadequacy of defense counsel. For all too 
long we grossly neglected the needs of defendants, but the 
inadequacy of defense counsel is not by any means the whole story. 
Since we are discussing the problems of a system of justice, it is 
important to bear in mind that criminal justice is not a one-way 
street. Judge J. Edward Lumbard observed in a speech about ten 
years ago that the public is also entitled to due process and 
justice and that a just conviction is as important to the public 
interest as a just acquittal. 19 
The enormous demands on criminal courts naturally reflect 
themselves in the burdens on prosecutors' offices. I observed this 
in terms of one large prosecution office where the legal staff 
doubled in five years. The records in appeals handled by that 
prosecution off ice, confirmed by personal observations of the 
judges and experienced trial lawyers, strongly suggested that there 
was a steady decline in the prosecutors' performance before and 
1 9 Judge Lumbard stressed this point repeatedly in speeches 
at the time. See in particular The Administration of Criminal 
Justice, 35 N.Y. St. B.J. 360 (1963); The Responsibility of the Bar 
for the Performance of the Courts, 34 N.Y. St. B.J. 169 (1962); The 
Lawyers' Responsibility for Due Process and Law Enforcement, 12 
Syracuse L. Rev. 431 (1961). 
after the increase in staff. Countless times in that jurisdiction, 
a prosecutor, on coming into the courtroom, would ask for a 
ten-minute recess so he could review a file he had never seen. 
In some places it is the observation of judges that the 
Criminal Justice Act has not brought about improvement in the 
general quality of criminal defense and that performance has not 
been generally adequate either by assigned private counsel or by 
the public defender office. I am sure that the situation varies 
from place to place, and the observation of other judges is that 
the institutionalization of defense work in defender offices holds 
the best promise for the future. For my part, it is probably too 
early to reach firm conclusions on the subject, but a choice may 
be compelled before long. 20 
We have long since institutionalized the prosecution of 
criminal cases because it best serves the public interest to 
discharge the function in that way, and the public interest in 
20 A detailed overview of this problem is found in Bazelon, 
The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1 (1973). 
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adequate defense representation is of equal order. Fifteen or 
twenty years ago, some otherwise sensible people tended to regard 
the idea of a public defender office as a form of "creeping 
socialism," but I am confident that attitude no longer has 
significant acceptance. 
However, even placing the defense of indigents largely if not 
entirely in the jurisdiction of a staff of career public defenders 
with the necessary auxiliary facilities does not in itself 
guarantee adequate advocacy skills. In fact, at present, the rapid 
expansion of both the prosecution of fices and public defender 
facilities has been accompanied by a trend to use either of these 
f unctions--or both--as a means for young lawyers to learn how to 
try cases. It would be instructive to assemble the data on the 
tenure of staff lawyers in prosecution and public defender offices. 
To have bright young men and women "flit" in and out of these 
off ices for two or three year apprenticeships may possibly be 
useful to them and their future clients, but it is a high price to 
pay if it results in inadequate performance for either side of a 
criminal trial. It is a matter of history that some prosecution 
offices--of which New York is a notable example--have been a 
proving ground for some of our most outstanding advocates, so I do 
not disparage the idea of a tour of duty as a prosecutor--or as a 
public defender. 
In our proper concern for criminal justice, we must not forget 
that the rights and interests of civil litigants should not be 
brushed under the rug. In nearly eighteen years on the bench and 
more than twenty years of general practice, I have had occasion to 
review literally thousands of records--civil, criminal and 
administrative--and I have observed as many miscarriages of justice 
in civil cases from inadequacy of counsel as in criminal cases. 
To borrow some lines from Gray's "Elegy," the injustice in some 
civil cases becomes part of "the short and simple annals of the 
poor.'' 21 In some of those cases, the human tragedy was very real 
to the principals. 
21 The Complete 
Hendrickson ed. 1966). 
Poems of Thomas Gray 38 ( H • Starr & J. 
v 
If there is substantial validity to this analysis of the 
problem, what should we do about it? 
Some system of specialist certification is inevitable and, as 
we know, it has been discussed in legal circles for a generation 
or more. Dean Robert B. McKay of New York University Law School 
has observed that the legal profession has "marched up the hill of 
specialist certification only to march right down again in the face 
of opposition from practitioners not discontent with the absence 
of regulation. " 22 Our commitment to the public and to the system 
of justice must not let us be marched down that hill any longer. 
I see nothing for lawyers, litigants, or courts to fear, and 
on the contrary I see a great potential gain, by moving toward 
specialist certification to limit admission to trial practice, 
beginning in courts of general jurisdiction where the more 
important claims and rights are resolved. When we have succeeded 
22 Role of Graduate Legal Education in the Development of the 
Legal Specialist, Dec. 10, 190, at 2 (paper prepared for symposium 
of ABA Special Committee on Specialization New Orleans) (footnote 
omitted). 
in that limited area we can then examine broader aspects of 
specialization. Furthermore, while the legal profession must 
obviously lead in this effort, the interests of the public dictate 
that the views of practitioners who are affected cannot be 
controlling any more than we allow the automobile or drug industry 
to have complete control of safety or public heal th standards. 
There are more than 200 million potential "consumers" of justice 
whose rights and interests must have protection, and it is the duty 
of the legal profession to provide reasonable safeguards--unless 
lawyers prefer regulation from the outside. 
Our traditional assumption that every lawyer, like the 
legendary Renaissance man, is equipped to deal effectively with 
every legal problem probably had some validity in the day of 
Jefferson, Hamilton, John Adams and John Marshall, but that 
assumption has been diluted by the vast changes in the complexity 
of our social, economic and political structure. 
The experience of the medical profession affords some guidance 
in its first step in specialty certification. That step was 
identifying those doctors genuinely competent to perform serious 
surgery and limiting access to the operating room to such doctors. 
Obviously there are and probably always will be sparsely populated 
areas in which some doctors and lawyers must be 
jacks-of-all-trades. But, the fact that this is a necessity 
imposed in some areas of the country by geography and population 
density does not mean that in the metropolitan centers where courts 
deal with thousands of cases we need or should tolerate ineffective 
representation. 
The American Bar Association has wisely cautioned that in 
undertaking certification programs, "it is not desirable for a 
large number of states to embark upon even experimental programs 
in specialization before uniform standards can be established lest 
unnecessarily divergent programs become prematurely crystallized. " 23 
The ABA committee, however, is carefully monitoring pilot or 
experimental programs commencing in California and Texas, among 
23 95 A.B.A. Rep. 329 (1970) • The ABA's Special Committee 
on Specialization in its 1973 Annual Report cited the avalanche of 
state projects and once again urged states yet to undertake pilot 
programs to ref rain from doing so until there has been an 
opportunity to evaluate those already in existence. ABA Report of 
Special Committee on Specialization 3, 6 (Aug. 1973). 
others. 
It is in this spirit of cautious progress that I urge that we 
should concentrate where, in the view of most judges, the greatest 
need exists. For the initial stage, moreover, we should limit 
ourselves to certification of trial advocates until we learn more 
about the problems of evaluation and selection. There is danger, 
as the ABA report stated, in trying to do too much too soon, 
without knowing enough about the pitfalls. The limited step of 
certifying trial advocates first will be a large enough task to tax 
our best efforts. Given the difficulty in terms of dealing with 
fifty separate state systems, perhaps the prudent thing to do is 
to begin with the United States District Courts. After 
experimenting in several representative federal districts and in 
state courts, the Judicial Conferences in the several circuits 
should consider this problem. 
PROPOSAL 
What I propose is a broad, four-point program as a first step in 
specialist certification. We should: 
First: Face up to and reject the notion that every law 
graduate and every lawyer is qualified, simply by virtue of 
admission to the bar, to be an advocate in trial courts in matters 
of serious consequence. 
Second: Lay aside the proposals for broad and comprehensive 
specialty certification (except where pilot programs are already 
under way) until we have positive progress in the certification of 
the one crucial specialty of trial advocacy that is so basic to a 
fair system of justice and has had historic recognition in the 
common law systems. 
Third: Develop means to evaluate qualifications of lawyers 
competent to render the effective assistance of counsel in the 
trial of cases. 
Fourth: Call on the American Bar Association the Federal Bar 
Association, the American College of Trial Lawyers, the American 
Association of Law Schools, the Federal Judicial Center, the 
National Center for State Courts and others to collaborate in 
prompt and concrete steps to accomplish the first step in a 
workable and enforceable certification of trial advocates. 
The fate of this proposal, as with any relating to progress 
in our profession, depends on the members of that great 
partnership" of the law made up of lawyers, judges and law 
teachers--and I have great confidence in that partnership. 
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